悉尼大学Erick (Zhaolin) Li 教授讲座预告

时间：2019年4月18日 10:00—12:00

地点：经管学院B区104

主办单位：经济与工商管理学院

主持人：徐鸿雁 教授

Robust Moral Hazard and Information Availability

鲁棒优化道德风险问题和信息获取

主讲人：Erick (Zhaolin) Li

This paper proposes a distribution-free approach to solving a moral hazard model in which a max-min principal hires an agent who selects the outcome distribution subject to moment constraints. Our formulation reveals that the model has an alternative interpretation of two-sided ambiguity where the principal and agent have opposing robust decision rules but form congruent expectations on the distribution selected by nature. The congruent expectation enables a reformulation of the problem into a linear program which provides a tractable approach to solving the robust contract without requiring Mirrlees-Rogerson conditions. The robust optimal contract is linear when the principal only knows the mean of the effort-outcome relationship. However, when the principal’s available information also includes the variance, a quadratic contract is robustly optimal and achieves the first best.

主讲人简介：

Erick (Zhaolin) Li，博士毕业于宾夕法尼亚州立大学，现担任悉尼大学商学院副教授。他的研究方向为供应链管理、运营管理与其它领域的交叉研究。已在《Management Science》、《Production & Operations Management》、《Decision Sciences》等运营管理领域的国际顶级期刊上发表多篇论文。